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Need a Warranty Be Material to Avoid a
Contract of Insurance in Montana?
In construing the effect of warranties in marine-insurance contracts,
the early English cases held that a breach of warranty avoided the policy
even though the warranty related to a matter which might not be material
to the risk. 1 A warranty defined the risk, and the parties could stipulate
that a statement made by the insured defining the risk should conclusively
be presumed to be material.
2
In Jeffries v. Economical Mutual Life Insurance Company,3 the
insured warranted that he was single when in fact he was married. The
Supreme Court of the United States held this was a defense to the insurer,
even though married men are better risks. Thus, the Supreme Court of
the United States adopted the English rule as applied to marine insurance
risks and uncritically applied it to non-marine insurance risks; and state
courts did the same thing.4 It is obvious that the transfer of the English
rule to non-marine insurance risks resulted in an unbalanced bargaining
situation between insured and insurer with the insurer's superior power
of selection and control over the risks. The courts slavishly followed,
"A rule of tight construction devised for astute bargains between
equals . . . (and) by the use of the printed forms the insurer nar-
rowly restricted the bargaining about warranties." 5
The official abrogation of the doctrine which precludes inquiry
into the materiality of facts warranted has been accomplished by statute
1 Kenyon & Another v. Berthon (1778), I Doug K.B. 12, 99 E.R. 10.
The warranty was, "In Port 20thof July, 1776.' The ship was proven
to have sailed the 18th. Lord Mansfield held this was a warranty and
though the difference of two days might not make any material differ-
ence in the risk, yet the underwriter was not liable.
2 DeHahn v. Hartley (1786) 1 Term R 343, 14 Engl. Rul. Cos. 171;
Baring v. Clagett (1802) 3 Bos & P. 201.
3(1874), 89 U. S. 47, 22 L. Ed. 833.
4 Duncan v. Sun River Fire Insurance (1831) 6 Wend. 488, 22 Am. Dec.
539; Fitch v. Amer. Popular Life Ins. Co. (1875) 59 N. Y. 557, 17
Am. Rep. 372.
6Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 595
(1934).
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in most of the states.6 The legislative intent of these statutes is evidently
to obviate the avoidance of insurance contracts upon breach of warranted
facts unless those facts are material to the risk.7 Statutes of this character
are valid, 8 and generally are liberally construed in favor of the insured
to preclude forfeiture for breach of a warranty which relates to an im-
material matter.9
64 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929), 6820a-820rr"
pp. 2628-2666. A number of statutes hove been drafted in such general
terms that they would seem to apply to every kind of insurance, e.g., Neb.
Camp. Stat. 1922, &7787 as set out and discussed in Muhlbach v. Ill. B.
Life Assn. (1922) 108 Neb. 146, 187 N.W. 787. The statutes of most
of the states apply to life policies either specifically or by implication.
e.g., Easton D. P. Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1923) 234 N. Y.
441, 138 N.E. 401 (Construing N. Y. Ins. Laws 1906, 581). Some
state statutes relate to health and occident policies, e.g., Conn. Pub.
Laws 1913-1915, p. 1849, Chap. 223; others to life and health, e.g.,
Makos v. Banker A. Ins. Co. (1921) (Mo. App.) 234 S.W. 369, con-
struing Mo. Rev. Stat. 1919, 66142; and still others to life and acci-
dent policies, e.g., Security L. Ins. Co. v. Schwartz (1922) 221 Mich.
Pub. Acts 1917, p. 607, &17. Fire insurance policies are within the
meaning and application of many statutes, e.g., Albert v. Mutual L. Ins.
Co. (1898) 122 N. C. 927, 65 Am. St. Rep. 693, (Construing N. C.
Act March 4, 1893.) Fidelity insurance has also been held to be within
the purview of some statutes, e.g., Kentucky, Minnesota, and Oklahoma
statutes have been held to apply to applications' for fidelity insurance.
7 Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Goodman, (1914) 10 Ala App. 446, 65 So.
449; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mandelbaum (1922) 207 Ala. 234, 92 So.
440, 29 A.L.R. 649.
8
Brotherhood of American Yeomen v. Manz, (1922) 23 Ariz. 610, 206
P. 403. Such statutes are generally considered as being within the states'
police power and not contrary to public policy, e.g., John Harcock M. L.
Ins Co. v. Warren (1901) 181 U. S. 73, 21 S. Ct. 535, 45 L. Ed. 765,
affirming Ohio Ins. St.
9 Metro. L. Ins. Co. v. Goodman, (1914) 10 Ala. App. 446, 65 So. 449.
However, some courts have failed to take into account the legislative
intent and have instead adhered to the rule precluding inquiry into the
materiality of a warranted fact, 4 COUCH( CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW (1929), &820a-820rr, pp. 2628-2666 and COUCH,
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT (1945) &820a-820rr. As a general rule,
the statute supersedes any conflicting contract provisions which expressly
make the answers in an application a part of the insurance contract
and material, e.g., Fidelity M. L. Association v. Ficklin, (1897) 74 Md.
185, 23 A. 197.
2
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THE STATUTES IN MONTANA AND CALIFORNIA
Montana and California early enacted statutes dealing with war-
ranties. 10 The first section to mention materiality, R.C.M. 1935, Section
8126, sets out the elements of a warranty as to the future, or a promis-
sory warranty. 1 1 It is provided, "A statement in a policy which imports
that it is intended to do or not to do a thing which materially affects the
risk, is a warranty that such an act or omission shall take place." R.C.M.
1935, Section 8128 further provides, "The violation of a material war-
ranty or other material provision of a policy, on the part of either party
thereto, entitles the other to rescind." 12 Here, materiality seems to be
extended to all types of warranties. But some qualification of this seems
contemplated by R.C.M. 1935, Section 8129, which provides, "A policy
may declare that a violation of specified provisions shall avoid it, other-
wise the breach of an immaterial provision does not avoid the policy." 13
Do these statutes require that a warranty must be material in order that
its breach avoid the policy? Certainly the mere reading of the statutes
leaves one confused; and the matter has not been clarified by the de-
cisions in Montana and California.
MONTANA DECISIONS
In Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,14 the insured sought
to recover upon a life insurance policy, in which had been incorporated the
application stating that he was not in any way "connected" with the liquor
business. The policy provided that it was to be void if any statement in
the application was not true. The Montana Supreme Court found that
1oR.C.M. 1935, 888121 through 8130 (Enacted 1895) and Cal. Civil
Code, 1920, &&2603 through 2612 (Enacted 1872) provide the same
in each respective section. In order to clarify discussion of the statutes
as interpreted by the California courts, Montana code numbers, as they
appear in R.C.M. 1935, &&8121 through 8130, will be substituted for
respective California code numbers in the body of this comment. R.C.M.
1935, &8121 provides: "A warranty is either express or implied," and
R.C.M. 1935, &8122 provides: 'No particular form of words is necessary
to create a warranty.' Further, R.C.M. 1935, 88123 provides, in effect,
that every express warranty must be contained in the policy itself or
incorporated therein by reference.
11Courts generally distinguish between affirmative and promissory war-
ranties. Generally, an affirmative warranty asserts an existing fact or
condition or a denial of its existence; whereas, a promissory warranty is
one in which the insured undertakes that some particular thing shall or
shall not be done or that some condition shall be fulfilled. See 4 COUCH
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929), &858, at p. 2823.
12 Cal. Civil Code, 1920, $2610.
13Cal. Civil Code, 1920, 82611.
14(1905) 32 Mont. 329, 80 P. 609, 108 Am. St. Rep. 58.
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the insured was not in any way "connected" with the liquor business and
therefore the fact warranted was not false. However, the court said,
obiter dictum, that cases cited by the insurer,
Ctundoubtedly sustain the view that it makes no difference whether
the particular representation is material to the risk or not, . . .
The question of materiality is settled and determined by the stipu-
lations of the contract, and their truth or falsity made determinative
of the rights of the parties."
In Pelican v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,15 it appears that the
insured stated in his application for life insurance that he had not suf-
fered from tuberculosis; and the policy provided that all statements made
by the insured were to be deemed representations and not warranties. The
insured died of acute pulmonary tuberculosis about nine months after
receipt of the policy. The court held that the statements were to be
construed as representations and not warranties. 16 However, the court
said in regard to a warranty,
"The general rule is that a warranty must be a part and parcel of
the contract, made so by express agreement of the parties upon the
face of the policy . . . It need not be actually material to the risk;
its falsity will bar recovery by the express stipulation the statement
is warranted to be true and thus is made material."
In Mandoli v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security,
17
it appears that the insured made statements in an application for life
insurance that she had not consulted or received treatment from a doctor
within five years previous to making the application for insurance and
the insured agreed that the statements in the application constituted war-
ranties. Evidence revealed that the insured had been treated for certain
minor ailments within the five years. The Montana Supreme Court, in
giving judgment for the insurer because of falsity of statements war-
ranted to be true, quoted the general rule advanced in Pelican v. Mutual
Life Insurance Co.18
16(1911) 44 Mont. 277, 288, 199 P. 778.
16The courts will always determine whether a representation is material.
The general test of materiality is "whether the insurer would have re-
garded the fact or matter communicated, as substantially increasing
chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the
risk or charging of an increased premium." See 29 Amer. Juris. 424,
4525. Penn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Saving Bank & T. Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th) 74 F. 413, 73 F. 653, and 38 L.R.A. 33, is cited.
1T(1920) 58 Mont. 671, 194 P. 493.
18(1911) 44 Mont. 277, 288, 199 P. 778.
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 9 [1948], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/12
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
In view of the dicta in these cases, it would seem that the insurer
may avoid a policy upon breach of an affirmative warranty which is
immaterial; but these cases made no reference to the statutory provisions. 19
Weyh et al v. California Insurance Co.,20 is the first case which
interprets the warranty sections of R.C.M. 1935 as applied to affirmative
warranties. It appears that insured bought an automobile from an auto-
mobile dealer who assigned the contract of conditional sale to a com-
mercial credit company. The latter secured a policy of insurance with
the defendant insurance company. The policy stated that the age of the
car was "warranted" by the insured. The car was a 1926 model, rather
than a 1927 model as was stated in the policy. The court held the war-
ranty was material to the risk involved since the age affected the premium
rate. 2 1 The plaintiff had contended, however, that "merely calling state-
ments warranties does not make them such"; and that the clause of the
policy rendering it void for misrepresentation of material facts, coupled
with the fact that the policy did not specifically designate the provisions
which would render it invalid, brought the policy within the rule respecting
representations. The plaintiff cited R.C.M. 1935, Section 8129,22 to up-
hold this contention. In answer, the court said this section "clearly refers
to provisions in a policy other than warranties" and that R.C.M. 1935,
Section 8125,23 dealing with an express warranty, and R.C.M. 1935, Sec-
tion 8130,24 which states that "a breach of warranty . . . in its inception
prevents the policy from attaching to the risk," were controlling. In
effect, the court said that materiality is not important if a policy states
that it is subject to warranties therein contained and that it shall be void
if any of them are violated by the assured.
The court's interpretation of R.C.M. 1935, Section 8129 would
seem to leave the situation in a more confused state than existed prior
to the court's decision. But it does appear that the Montana Supreme
Court has not abrogated the distinction between representations and war-
ranties, and, where there is false affirmative warranty, the Montana court
will not look to the materiality of the fact warranted but will consider
the contract of insurance voidable.
19R.C.M. 1935, 68121 through 8130.
20 (1931) 89 Mont. 298, 296 P. 1030.
21The court cited HUDDY ON AUTOMOBILES (8th Ed.) p. 1139 and
BERRY+ON AUTOMOBILES, p. 1570.
22CaI. Civil Code, 1920, .2611.
23Col. Civil Code, 1920; $2607.
2 4Col. Civil Code, 1920, 42612.
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CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
How have the California courts interpreted the same statutes? In
Solomon v. Federal Insurance Co.,25 a fire insurance policy was issued
covering the insured's car. The policy stated that it was to be null and
void if any warranty was breached. The court held a misdescription of
the age of the car to be
'tsuch a material misdescription of the thing insured as to consti-
tute a breach of express warranty provided for in" . . . R.C.M.
1935, Section 8125.
It was said further,
"If the misdescription of the auto amounts to a breach of war-
ranty, this clause in the policy taken in connection with ... (R.C.M.
1935, Section 8129) of the civil code, precludes any consideration
of the materiality of the breach."
Again, in Wilkinson v. Standard Accident Isurance Company of
Detroit,26 the court gaid, obiter dictum,
"An agreement between insurer and insured that the falsity of any
statement in an application for insurance will avoid the policy is
binding, regardless of the materiality of the statement."
In Bennett v. Northwestern National Insurance Company,27 an
insurance policy covering fire and theft of a car was issued containing
a warranty clause that statements of certain facts in the policy were war-
ranted to be true. The court said,
"It is the general rule that an affirmative warranty is in the nature
of a condition precedent to the validity of the policy, and, if broken
in its inception, the policy never attaches to the risk which it pur-
ports to cover . . . without regard to the materiality of the facts
warranted."
Thus the California court seemed to hold that materiality is not
important when dealing with an affirmative warranty.
Victoria S. S. Co. v. Western Assurance Co. of Toronto28 involved
an agreement whereby the amount of money the insured would earn
by carrying a load of lumber was insured. The premium rate was fixed
at a certain percentage of the freight to be charged. The assured agreed
to declare the amount of the risk, i.e., the amount of lumber shipped,
26(1917) 176 Cal. 133, 167 P. 859.
26(1919) 180 Cal. 252, 180 P. 607.
27(1927) 84 Cal. App. 130, 257 P. 586.
28(1914) 167 Cal. App.130, 257 P. 586.
6
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when it became -known to him. The ship burned while being loaded. The
court held that the failure to declare the amount of the risk as it became
known was not an act which materially affected the risk since such a
declaration could not change the amount of the premium or the liability
of the insurer in case of loss. The court construed Sections 8126,29
8128,30 and 812931 together in saying that,
"under these provisions no right to avoid or rescind a subsisting
policy occurs from the violation of any provision thereof, whether
technically a warranty or not, unless such provision is material,
except in such cases where the policy itself declares that such breach
shall avoid it."
In answer to the defendant's contention that Sections 8126 and 8128
were applicable only to implied warranties and that the violation of an
express warranty avoids the policy regardless of materiality, 3 2 the court
said,
"Under section . . . (8126) a warranty, whether express or implied
is deemed to be material only when it is to do or not to do a thing
which materially affects the risk."
But in this case, the court was construing the effect of a promissory war-
ranty as distinct from an affirmative warranty. 33  The case may be
declaratory of a principle that a breach of immaterial provisions in a
policy will avoid it only if the policy specifically provides for such avodi-
ance upon breach thereof.3 4 But it is not clear that the California court
would consider materiality important when dealing with an affirmative
warranty, although the California court, unlike the Montana Supreme
Court, does seem to take the position that R.C.M. 1935, Section 8129
applies to warranty.
2 9
Cal. Civil Code, 1920, 2608.
3 OCal. Civil Code, 1920, &2610.
31Cal. Civil Code, 1920, &2611.
3 2
Generally, implied warranties have been restricted to marine insurance
policies, i.e., implied warranty as to seaworthiness. See 4 COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAWS (1929) &858, p. 2822.
3 3 Gise v. Fidelity & Cos. Co. of N. Y. (1922) 188 Cal. 429, 206 P. 624,
22 A.L.R. 1476, involved a warranty that no person would be employed
by the assured in violation of law. The court held since employment of
persons under legal age materially affected the risk, breach would allow
the insurer to avoid the policy.
3 4 Everett v. Standard A. Ins. Co. (1920) 45 Cal. App. 332, 187 P. 996,
involved an accident insurance policy. The policy stated, "Full com-
pliance of the insured . . . with all provisions of this policy is a condi-
tion precedent to recovery hereunder . . ." The court recognized this
language to be in the nature of a promissory warranty but said it fell
short of a declaration ". . . that a violation of specified provisions shall
avoid.it," as provided in 68129 (Cal. Civil Code, 1920, 62611).
7
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It is obvious that legislative action is necessary to clarify the Mon-
tana statutes. It is submitted that California took a step in the right
direction when, in 1935, its legislature enacted a law,35 affecting "every
policy of life, disability, or life and disability insurance issued or delivered
within this state .... " which provides:
.... and all statements purporting to be made by the insured shall,
in absence of fraud, be representations and not warranties. Any
waiver of the provisions of this section shall be void." 3 6
The advent of an abrogation of the distinction between represen-
tations and warranties would almost certainly result in abandonment of
the common law doctrine of materiality with respect to warranties.
3 7
If all statements by the insured in a policy are treated as representations,
the materiality of the statements will be inquired into in every case;
whether the warranty is express or implied, promissory or affirmative.
Thus, the insured will be freed from the courts' application of a harsh




35 Cal. Statutes, 1935, Ch. 245, l101 13.
3 6Martin v. Mut. Ben. Health and Acc. Assn. (1945) 71 Col. App. (2d)
557, 162, P. (2d) 980, involved materiality of statements set forth in
on application for insurance.
37 Under such statutes, it has been held that the question of materiality of
any such statement is for the jury, e.g., Penn. Mut. Life Ins Co. v.
Mechanics Say. Bank and Trust Co. (1896) 72 F. 413, 19 C.C.A. 286,
38 L.R.A. 33, unless the matter involved is manifestly material to the
risk, e.g., March v. Insurance Co. (1898) 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100,
65 Am. St. Rep. 887; nor can the parties by expressly agreeing upon
materiality of the statement made, withdraw the question from the jury,
e.g., Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig (1882) 80 Ky. 223. Under the com-
mon law rule, breach of warranty avoids the contract irrespective of its
gravity, i.e., literal truth is essential to the validity of the contract of
insurance; whereas, a false representation must not only be made with
respect to a material matter and be false but it must appear that the
applicant knows the falsity of the fact stated to be true and that it was
made with a fraudulent and corrupt motive, e.g., Hazard v. New Eng-
land M. Ins. Co., (1834) 8 Pet. 557, 8 L. Ed. 1043; Lieberman v.
American B. & Cas. Co. (1922) 244 S.W. 102
38Supra, note 5
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